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N/A: In Defense of the Right to Live: The Constitutionality of Therape

IN DEFENSE OF THE RIGHT TO
LIVE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THERAPEUTIC ABORTION'
In recent years public sentiment favoring a liberal modification of the
legal position on abortion has been noticeably increasing. Particularly indicative of the public concern was the wide-spread publicity in 1962 given
the Finkbine situation. 2 And, despite commentary that no change in the
abortion laws of the respective states is likely to be forthcoming,3 seventeen states are currently studying, or have recently studied, the possibility
of more liberal abortion legislation.4 In addition, two states, Colorado and
North Carolina, have adopted liberalized statutes within the last few
months. 5 Based upon the thesis, then, that pervasive reformation is imminent, this Comment purports to examine the underlying constitutional
validity of such abortion legislation; for, if therapeutic abortion is legally
objectionable at all, the grounds would necessarily be constitutional. Nothing but the importance given the rights of the individual fetus could outweigh the great public interest in alleviating the acknowledged butchery
1 The following is essentially a legal discussion. In order to facilitate analysis, therefore,
religious and ethical arguments have been scrupulously excluded. Social, economic, and
psychological factors are treated only to the extent that they determine policy or impinge
upon the legal issues involved. However, for an excellent short synopsis of the range of

responsible arguments for and against abortion on the grounds not treated herein, see
SCHUR, CRImS W THouTr Vicma s: DavuCNr BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POICY 11 (1965).
2 Mrs. Finkbine, a thirty-year-old mother of four and resident of Arizona, had been

taking tranquilizers containing thalidomide during her pregnancy. At first reluctant to
follow her doctor's advice to abort to avoid any undue hardship which might arise were
the baby born deformed, Mrs. Finkbine and her husband finally decided to have the
operation performed. However, medical authority was withdrawn at the last minute. A
suit for declaratory judgment in the Arizona courts was unsuccessful. Mrs Finkbine
finally proceeded to Sweden, where the abortion was performed. The case was not reported by the lower court; the facts given were taken from ScHURn, CP, ins Wrrnor
VIcTIMs: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PuBLIc PoLIcY 11-12 (1965). For discussion of the thalidomide problem and situations that have arisen because of it, see ST. JonN-SmVA, Tnu
RIGHT TO L E 3-25 (1964).
3 See Scnun, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58; Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal
Foundations,49 GEo. L.J. 173 (1960).
4 See Playboy, Aug., 1967, pp. 35-36; Playboy, May, 1967, pp. 149-50. The states which
have considered revision are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Playboy, Aug., 1967, pp. 35-36; Playboy, May,
1967, pp. 149-50. However, reform legislation has been rejected by the states of Arizona,
Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico and New York. Playboy, May, 1967,
pp. 149-50; Playboy, Aug., 1967, pp. 35-36.
5 CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 40-2-50, 51 (1967), 52; GEN. STAT. N.C. § 14-5.1 (Adv. Pamphlet
No. 3, 1967).
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of 15,000 women annually by criminal abortionists,( and the anguish caused
the parents of malformed or undesired children.
General StatisticalInformation and Enforceability
of Present Abortion Statutes

Few, if any, offenses are less enforceable or enforced than criminal abortion. 7 It is estimated that a total of 1,300,000 miscarriages or abortions
(spontaneous, therapeutic, and criminal) occur annually in the United
States. 8 This figure represents only a fraction of the real number, since
there is no practical way to determine the number of pregnancies terminated while the zygote is still very small. This unrealized figure would also
undoubtedly include a large number of induced abortions occurring in the
first few months of pregnancy.
Estimates of the ratio of total miscarriages of all types to the total number
of pregnancies indicate that miscarriages occur in sixteen to forty-three
per cent of all pregnancies. 9 For obvious reasons, no accurate determina.
tion can be made of the number of miscarriages criminally induced. However, suggested approximations range from thirty-four to sixty-nine per
cent of all terminated pregnancies.'o Numerical transposition of these estimates shows that there are between 300,000 to one million criminal abortions committed annually in the United States." And, as indicated above,
2
15,000 women die yearly from the after-effects of such operations.
Convictions under the various abortion statutes, on the other hand, number only 2,500, according to a 1951 estimate.18 Moreover, one researcher
expresses doubt that a woman has ever been convicted for her willing participation in such a felonious enterprise. 14 The desire for secrecy which
motivates a woman to secure an illegal abortion obviously militates against
successful prosecution of offenders. 15 The operations are usually conducted
without prior or subsequent association of the parties involved; normally,
only the woman and the abortionist are present, and both have reason to
avoid publication of the event. Thus, even when the authorities are aware
that abortions are being performed by a certain individual, it is extremely
difficult to obtain the evidence necessary for a conviction. Where there is
6 3 GRAY, AcrroRN Ys' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1 58.01 (3d ed. 1966).

7 See SCHUR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 35, 36, 38-40.
8 Fisher, CriminalAbortion, 42 J. CGM. L., C & P.S. 242 (1951); see Scnu, op.
note 2, at 12.
9 3 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 6.
10 Fisher, supra note 8. See also 3 GRAY, op. cit. supranote 6, at f 58.02.
11 See Fisher, supra note 8; ScHUR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12.
12

cit. supra

3 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 6. Hereinafter, any reference to a criminal operation will

include any criminal abortion whether by operation or otherwise.
1s Fisher, supra note 8, at 244.
14 SCHUR,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 36.

15 See generally Fisher; supra note 8, at 248-49; SCHUR, op. cit. supra note 2, at B6.38.
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an early termination of the pregnancy, proof of pregnancy, except where
the particular statute does not require it,16 and proof of the more difficult
element of causation are practically impossible to show from external evidence. In most cases, therefore, the police must actually interrupt the performance of the operation to obtain a conviction.17
The Current Legal Position
Statutes prohibiting abortion have been traced at least as far back as
the Code of Hammurabi.18 The American statutes, however, have their
roots in the more recent English common law. Blackstone, whose understanding on this point paralleled Coke's, 19 wrote the following in his
Commentaries concerning abortion:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant
is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with
child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any
one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered
of a dead child; this, though not murder was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this
offense in quite so atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.20
Although several aspects of the common law position will be treated more
fully within, it is important to notice at the outset that the death of the
fetus was a necessary element of the common law crime of abortion.- Moreover, if the child were not "quick", it was not alive in the contemplation of
law and an induced miscarriage was therefore not a criminal abortion.22
The requirement that the child be quick-that is, at such a state of development that it moved within its mother's womb-was in all probability
an abitrary line drawn in the reproduction cycle for evidentiary purposes.
Medicine was by no means a refined science at early common law; on the
other hand, the criminal law necessarily demanded a definite line of demarcation between actions criminal and non-criminal. Undoubtedly, by
Blackstone's time there must have been a growing realization that the
development of a child was a gradual thing and that embryonic life in
some form existed before the child quickened. In any case, in 1803 the first
1 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 456.020(l) (1955); People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57,

257 P.2d 29 (1953).
17 See note 15 supra.
18 See Quay, supra note 3, at 399-400.
19 3 CoKE, TmnU INsT. 50 (1797).
20 1 BLACSrONF. COMMEr
rMFS 129-30 (4th ed. 1771).
21 PEnRs, CRnNmAL LAw 101 (1957).
22

Ibid.
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of a series of reforming statutes was passed in England which removed
24
the requirement that the child be quick as an element of the crime.
The first American statute making abortion a crime was passed in Connecticut in 1821,25 and this example was eventually followed in all of the
states.26 The emphasis in these enactments, however, tends to be more upon
the action, rather than the result.2 7 Thus, some courts have held that the
28
crime was committed even though the child was not in fact aborted. 3
Some statutes, moreover, provide for additional punishment in the event
that the child die. 29 Indeed, a few courts have even held that the woman
0
need not in fact be pregnant to establish the commission of the crime.8
One writer has suggested that the apparent discrepancy in approach to
abortion between the common law and the American statutes can be explained by the fact that an attempt at common law was punished in the
same manner as the crime itself, 31 such that the death of the child determined only the nature of the crime, and not the degree of punishment.
Abortion is almost universally and specifically excusable under the
American statutes when the life of the mother is endangered by the pregnancy. 32 Earlier decisions had construed this exception literally, such that
therapeutic abortion was permissible only when the life of the mother was
in fact physically threatened.8 3 However, in 1939 the English case of Rex
v. Bourne34 was decided under a statutory exception similar to that found
in the American statutes. Bourne, an eminent London physician, disclosed
to the authorities that he was going to perform an abortion upon a fifteen23 For discussions of the development of English statutory law on abortion, see DIcKENs,
ABORTION AND THE LAw 23-38 (1966); WILUAMS, THE SANcTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL

LAw 152-56 (1957); Quay, supra note 3, at 431-53.
24 Miscarriage of Women Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58; see Quay, supra note 3, at 431-32.
25 See Quay, supra note 3, at 435. The statute was modeled upon the English Miscarriage of Women Act. Ibid.
26 For a complete though slightly anachronistic collection of all the American state
abortion statutes, see Quay, supra note 3, at 447-520 (Appendix I). See also WILLAMS,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 156-60.
27 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 101-102.

28 See, e.g., Crichton v. United States, 92 T.2d 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 702
(1937); cf. Urga v. State, 155 Fla. 86, 20 So. 2d 685 (1945).
29 E.g., REv. LAws OF HAWAII § 309-3 (1955); Ky, REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 436.020(1), (2) (1955).
30 See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); Territory of Hawaii v.
Young, 37 Hawaii 150, 159-60 (1945); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. RP'R. 1251, 125253, 1255, 60 S.W. 400, 401-03 (1901).

31 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 101.
32 See Quay, supra note 3, at 447-520; WILLIAsS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 160,
33 See, e.g., State v. Brandenburg, 58 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1948). See generally WILIAMS, op.

cit. supra note 23, at 164-66.
34 Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687. A transcript of the jury charge in this case appears
in Quay, supra note 3, at 521. See also DIcKENS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 38; WILLIAMS, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 160-63.
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year-old girl who had conceived as the result of a brutal rape. Bourne performed the operation openly and was subsequently indicted. The defense
entered was excusable homicide, based on the premise that the girl's mental
stability was threatened by the pregnancy. The trial court instructed the
jury that if it found that the girl's mental health was in fact threatened,
the abortion was excusable.3 5 On appeal, this construction of the statute
was upheld by the King's Bench.38
Although this result has been influential in England and the United
States, 37 it has marked, until recently, the outer limits of the permissibleabortion exception. In 1962, the American Law Institute, in its final draft
of the Model Penal Code, urged adoption of legislation which would permit
abortion in cases where the physical or mental health of the mother was
endangered, where the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defect, or where pregnancy resulted from felonious intercourse. 3 This position has been adopted in two states and apparently is under consideration
in seventeen other states. 39
The Right to Live and the Constitution
As indicated by the quotation from Blackstone above, 40 abortion as a
crime at common law was predicated upon the religiously imbued sanctity
of human life. 4 ' The fact that death of the fetus was not treated as murder,42 albeit that such death was a necessary element of the crime,43 perhaps
indicates an unexpressed distinction between "degrees of being" that justifled a concomitant distinction in legal consequences. Nonetheless, implicit in the common law, and underlying it, is the recognition that the
embryonic state was in some sense human existence worthy of legal
protection.
The implicit sanctity of human life was therefore by incorporation a
fundamental in the law of the newly created American states. Indeed, it
was the cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence:" paralleling
the common law, Jefferson's words indicate that the basis of this belief was
primarily religious: "that all men are endowed by their Creator with cer35

Rex v. Bourne, [1938] 3 All. E.R. 615 (K.B.).

36 Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
37 See WmLUAs, op. cit. supra note 23, at 163, 164-66; cf. Sacn, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 55-58.
38 MODEL PmEAL CODE § 230.3 (Fin. Draft 1962).

39 See notes 4-5 supra.
40 See text accompanying note 20 supra.

op. cit. supra note 2, at 12-13.
42 See notes 19-21 supra.
43 See note 21 supra.
44 See ST. JoHN-STEvAs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13. It is interesting to note that two
41 See ST. JoHN-STVAS,

important political bodies, one being the United Nations, expressed post-World War 11
reaffirmation of the natural law right to life. See Id. at 13-14.
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tain unalienable rights; that among these rights are life .

.

. ...
,45 How-

ever, the political context in which this right was recognized was to a
large degree also the product of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on
human rights derived from natural law.4 6 The degree to which each of
these influences contributed to the expression of the concepts of human
rights in American political thought is, of course, impossible to determine.
But irrespective of the origin of the concept, the Constitution written
for the United States likewise implicitly adopted the right to live as an
inherent federal right.47 Although the history of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution indicates that the Court does not feel bound
by the visions of the founding fathers and that the Constitution must be
adapted to the changing needs of society, 48 the right to live must be deemed
to underlie the whole framework of the Constitution's guarantees; for
without the implicit existence of that right, the other protections become
hollow mockeries. The vitality and meaning given the Bill of Rights in
criminal prosecutions in recent years by the Court' t0 indicates that the
tradition of individual rights has not been abrogated. Therefore, it must
be said that the inherent individual right to personal existence is likewise
recognized by the current and viable law.50
This right is not absolute; yet the Bill of Rights, with its corollary extension to the states through the fourteenth amendment, as construed by the
Supreme Court, requires that due process be strictly observed before an
individual can be deprived of his life or liberty by governmental authority. 1 The life of an individual cannot be otherwise taken unless in
war (which is justifiable upon the theory that the societal and legal structure, which is a priori the basis for the right, is endangered),5 or in defense
of life, 53 or to prevent the commission of a dangerous felony. 4 In the
latter instances, the wrongdoer's life is balanced against imminent danger
to the lives of others. 5 When a wrongdoer's life is taken through govern.
45 Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence of the American States (1776). (Emphasis
added.)
40 See note 41 supra.
47 It is admitted, however, that no express reference to the existence of such a right
is made in the Constitution.
48 Compare, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 33
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See
also note 44 supra.
50 See note 44 supra.
51 See, e.g., cases cited notes 48-49.
52 See PERsKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 28 (1957); ST. JOHN-STEvAs, Tim RiGIrr To Lw1s 105

(1964).
53 See PEuNs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 883-912.

54 See PEsuKNS, op. cit. supra note 52, at 28, 880-82.
55 See notes 53-54 supra.
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mental process, on the other hand, the justification for such a taking is the
rationalization that by committing an offense so heinous as to be deemed
capital, the wrongdoer has ostracized himself from society and has forfeited the rights which were inherent by reason of his membership
therein. 56 But in no case is life forfeited without malfeasance on the part
of the forfeiter.
It might be argued, however, that the constitutional guarantee of the
right to live extends only as far as necessary to prevent deprivation of that
right by governmental authority without due process. Thus, in an abortion
context, assuming arguendo that constitutionally protected life is in ewse
during the fetal stage, the issue would become whether or not the state
or federal government could devise a system that would give sufficient
protection to the individual rights such that a resultant decision to abort
would satisfy due process. Such a system would probably have to allow a
hearing, at which the fetus would be represented by a guardian ad litem
or similar agent.
The validity of such a proposed system could be challenged on the
ground that to deprive an individual of such a fundamental right as the
right to live by a hearing at whici he was not intelligently present, but
represented only by proxy, would not satisfy due process. However, a more
basic objection to circumscription of the right to live, that is, limiting the
extent of the right to unauthorized governmental deprivation, can be
found in the recent Congressional extension of constitutional protections.
The Civil Rights Act 57 represents, in part, a codification of the constitutional guarantees which had formerly been designed to protect the individual from governmental infringement, in such a manner as to protect
the individual from infringement of those guarantees by other individuals.55 It can be said that this statute represents a basic change in attitude
toward certain rights guaranteed by the Constitution. These rights are no
longer a matter of relation between the citizen and the governing body,
but rather have been made inherent by virtue of the individual's existence
and his federal citizenship. 59 The recently decided case of United States v.
Guest,60 in which the Supreme Court found the existence of an inherent,
constitutionally guaranteed federal right to travel in interstate commerce,
thereby bringing an infringement of that right by individuals within the
cit. supra note 52, at 85.
57 Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1964).
56 See ST. JoHN-STEVAs, op.
58 Ibid.
59 The writer is indebted to a lecture by Professor D. Meade Feild of the University of
Georgia Law School for this insight. According to Professor Feild, the Gueat case Tepresents an important step in the Supreme Court's battle to protect individual rights. By
use of the "inherent federal right" doctrine, the Court can extend its jurisdiction to individual infringements upon personal liberty, possibly even to the extent the fourteenth
amendment protects the individual from state infringement.
60 United States v. Guest, 383 US. 745 (1966).
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criminal prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act, supports this analysis. 01 It
follows, then, that since no right could be more inherent or basic than the
right to live, protection only against infringement by governmental at.
thority is inadequate, when the pervasive nature of the right and the
modem attitude toward such a right are considered.
It is fundamental that at the point human life is recognized as being
in esse, the constitutional protections of that life become vested rights. 02
And although these rights may be limited because of minority or other
conditions, they may not be abrogated. 68 It therefore becomes crucial when
considering the constitutionality of a statute that extends the permissible
bounds of therapeutic abortion to determine at what point human-and
therefore constitutionally protected-life is in esse; for once the inherent
right to live vests, an innocent being cannot be justifiably or logically
deprived of this life unless an equally compelling social detriment is alleviated by such taking.
The Inception of Human Existence

Although the fetal stage is recognized as human life in some sense of
the word, both at common law and by majority rule today,0 4 the full protection of that life as human did not and does not rise until the child is
born.6 5 The legal test of separate human existence is the ability of the
child's circulatory system to operate independent of the mother's.00 But,
in legal recognition, the lesser protection given the fetus by laws prohibiting abortion extends, depending on the jurisdiction, from either conception 67 or the point at which the child "quickens" 08 till the time of birth.
In medical and statistical usage, however, abortion means expulsion from
the uterus before the child is "viable," that is, "capable of being reared." 09
61 Ibid.
62 It might be said that a right such as the fifth amendment guarantee against selfincrimination will not vest until, in the case of a child, the individual is competent to

commit a crime. Though the point at which rights other than the right to live vest Is not

of immediate concern here, and though a decision that criminal protections do not vest
until the age of competency is reached would not be determinative of the issue instant, It
would seem better to hold that, though the criminal constitutional protections vest at
the time human life-and, hence, federal citizenship-is recognized, they do not become
operative until brought into issue by the culpable conduct of the individual.
63 See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
64 See WIIUAMs, THE SANcriTY oF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAIw 149 (1957); notes 19-21
supra. See also Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233 (1923).

65 See

cit. supra note 52, at 27.
op. cit. supra note 64, at 5-7.

PERKINS, op.

66 WILLAMS,

67 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 436.020(1), (2) (1955); N.M.
68 E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 200.210 (1963).
69 WILLIAMs,

STAT.

ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1964).

op. cit. supra note 64, at 146-47.
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A child is regarded as viable from somewhere between the twenty-fourth
and twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. 7°
Considering the factual reality of the child's development, the legal test
of independent circulation is archaic. Consider two children at equal stages
of physiological development, one viable but prematurely born, the other
viable but unborn: a person who would kill the child born would be punished for murder, whereas the killer of the unborn child would be guilty
only of abortion in most states.7 1 From the other point of view, the first
child is fully vested with constitutional guarantees and protections, whereas
the second has none. To classify the respective rights and liabilities upon
such a physiological accident seems as specious as to classify sets of rights
on the basis of the physiological accident of color. Since abortion statutes
must by their nature recognize implicitly some interest of the fetus in the
continuance of its existence, such discrimination in the levels of protection
granted those born and those unborn seems particularly inconsistent.
Because of this extended medical knowledge, some courts have recognized the legal standing of the fetus to sue in tort. At least eight states
recognize the right of an unborn child to have suit brought for damages
for prenatal injury in his own behalf,7 2 though the right to recover is
in some jurisdictions conditioned upon the fetus' survival to birth7 " This
latter qualification is apparently predicated upon the theory that no injury
has been realized by the child unless it survives, and upon the inherent
difficulty of proving before birth the elements of causation and damages.
Nonetheless, other courts have recognized a suit by the administrator of
the estate of an unborn child or the parents thereof, suing in the child's
name, for the wrongful death of the fetus. 74
If the "independent circulation" test is unrealistic, where then should
the line be drawn to separate fetuses whose right to a continued existence
will be constitutionally protected and those in whom the right has not
yet vested? At first glance, the point at which the fetus becomes viable
70 Fisher, Criminal Abortion, 42 J. oF CRnI. L., C. & PS. 242 (1951); see 3 GR.AY, Ar58.02, at 596 (3d cd. 1966); WuAV. S, op. cit. supra

TO3NEYS' TExTBooa OF MEDIcIwE

note 64, at 146-47.
71 See Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations,49 Gao.

L.J. 173,

395, 447-520 (1961).
72 Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 ircE. L Ray. 579, 589-90 (1965). In those states,
legal personality exists from conception. Ibid.
73 Ibid.; see, e.g., Hornbucdle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727
(1956). The requirement of survival has been criticized, however. See, e.g., Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., 341 F.2d 75, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1964).
74 E.g., Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn.
Sup. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966). But see, e.g., Estate of Powers v. City of Troy, 4 Mich. App.
572, 145 N.W.2d 418 (1966). It would seem that the child must be viable at the time of
death, however, for the action to be maintained. See Gullborg v. Rizzo, supra; Hatala v.
Markiewicz, supra.
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would seem the most logical demarcation line. However, the period during
which a fetus becomes viable ranges approximately from the twenty-fourth
to the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. 75 In the case of any particular
child, the exact point may differ from that at which another child becomes
viable. Even in respect to a given child, this point may not be definitely
determinable. 76 Therefore, to attempt to specify any particular day (the
first day of the twenty-fourth week, for example) as determinative of the
vesting of the right is of questionable validity. Moreover, when the funda.
mental nature of the right in question is considered, the difficulty of ascertaining a reasonable basis for such a classification is increased. A pregnancy which has lasted twenty-two weeks and six days may produce a child
as viable as one which has endured for twenty-three weeks. The line drawn
is merely arbitrary, and would probably not satisfy due process. Moreover,
it is not always possible to determine the exact date on which conception
occurred, 77 and measurements from an indeterminate point are also necessarily indeterminate.
However, although the exact point at which the child becomes viable
may be impossible to ascertain, some stage in the fetal development can
be arbitrarily selected at which every physician would agree that the child
is not viable-for example, when the head first becomes distinct from the
rest of the body.78 Such a classification would avoid the risk of excluding
viable children encountered in the first-suggested alternative. Moreover,
whereas in the former alternative the classification line would have to be
as rigid as possible to accord adequate weight to the importance of tie right
involved, the "physiological development" standard selected could be far
enough removed from the period of viability to allow the burden of proof
on the biological issue to be a more nebulous thing. In a close case, whether
the child was aborted or not would not be logically of much import, since
a degree of flexibility would have been intentionally provided for. In this
manner viability could be indirectly established as the actual, though not
legal, point of demarcation.
The fact that the individual's right to life would not vest until whatever
point in his physiological development is selected would not preclude the
state from defining the induction of miscarriage before that point as a
crime. The preservation of the race or the attendant risk to the mother's
life in operating would seem to be of sufficient public concern to warrant
legislative prohibition. On the other hand, the legislature would not neces75 See note 70
76 See 3 GRAY,

supra.
op. cit. supra note 70, at 609-10. The author traces in general terms the
week to week development of the fetus.
77 See 3 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 70, at 606-09.
78 This occurs in the third or fourth week of pregnancy. 3 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 70,
at 609.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss4/9

10

N/A: In Defense of the Right to Live: The Constitutionality of Therape
1967]

THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS

sarily have to define the killing of a fetus after it had reached the demarcadon stage as murder. As long as the right of the individual is protected,
the legislature should have the right to determine the nature and degree
of the punishment to be exacted upon the offender. The public and private
interests would seem to be distinct to that degree at least.
But to attempt to limit so important a right as the right to live in such
an arbitrary manner seems somewhat specious. It is known from the physical sciences that from the moment of conception the zygote assumes a
basic chromatic structure that makes it a unique physical entity. According
to the statistics available for the United States, the zygote has thereafter
between sixty and ninety per cent probability of survival to birth7 -perhaps a higher probability if induced abortions are eliminated from consideration. Whether the time of vesting of the right to live should be
extended back to conception depends upon weighing the private interest
in the probable survival to birth against the quasi-public interest in avoiding (1) pain and anguish for the child's mother and family in the case of
rape where there is imminent danger to the mother's health; and (2) the
familial, maternal and the child's potential suffering in the cases of incest
or fetal deformity.80 The public is also interested to the extent that so
many women die needlessly at the hands of abortionists. Unquestionably,
therapeutic abortion under sanitary hospital conditions could greatly decrease the mortality rate among expectant mothers. In addition, unwanted
children in such cases may become a financial burden to the state by becoming its wards.
It must be remembered, however, that the fetus whose survival is being
decided is in no way responsible for the circumstances which resulted in
his conception. Thus, although a rape victim has the right to resist with
even deadly force the onslaught of her assailant, 8 ' the act once completed
terminates the crime. The fact that bearing the child resulting from the
rape is distasteful or even traumatic to the woman should not outweigh
the child's interest in probable survival. So, too, in ie case of the child
resulting from incestuous intercourse.
In a similar manner the arguments for probable injury to the mother's
physical or mental well-being can be met. Unless the mother is to lose her
life if the pregnancy continues, how can her personal suffering prevail over
the potential life of another? It should be added, however, that where the
mother has demonstrated a dear intention to commit suicide unless the
child is aborted, this would probably be sufficient indication of a mental
See Fisher, supra note 70.
So See generally ScHuR, Cmhms -%rrHorrVzcn~ms: DEVI_ r BUMAoR AND PUBuc PouCY
11-60 (1965); WniA"s, op. cit. supra note 64, at 206-20, 23347; Symposium, 17 IV. Rzs. L
R-v. 369 (1965).
79

81 PERKINs, CRmnaNAL LAW 880-83 (1957).
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disposition very likely to result in the death of the mother. 82 In a clear case
of this sort, as in a situation where the mother's life is physically endangered by the presence of the child, abortion may be justifiable. It is obvious
in such circumstances that either or both lives will be lost if no action is
taken. It would be an absurd law that required that nothing be done to
avoid such an undesirable consequence. Here, a life is balanced for a life,
as in a case of self-defense, although the mother, as well as the child, might
not be culpable. The interests, however, are equal, and the law has long
recognized that such a case should be expected from the definition of criminal abortion.83
That the likelihood of physical or mental deformity of the fetus should
justify abortion is the least comprehensible of all the proposed exceptions.
To permit abortion on this ground is to say that one or more persons can
decide that the interest of another yet unborn in the fulfillment of his
probable term and subsequent existence in the world is outweighed by
the fact that he might spend that life in a deformed state. This position
is without merit on two grounds: First, it assumes that life is meaningless
unless some unspecified degree of physical and mental normalcy is obtainable. Second, this rationale presupposes that one or more persons have the
right to decide whether another shall or shall not live. The first assumption
is absurd on its face. The second is diametrically inconsistent with the current legal notion of individual rights developed at the outset of this note.
Furthermore, it raises the suspicion that it is the desire to avoid personal
suffering of the group that would abort, rather than the best interests of
the fetus, which is the primary motivation for the operation.
That many women die annually of careless and unskillful abortions is
a tragic and lamentable fact of reality. However, the women involved did
have the choice to avoid the operation; the fetus has not ability to avoid
any of the causative or resultant circumstances. To ay that if you retain
the law prohibiting abortion, women will still resort to illegal operations,
and that some will die consequently, adds nothing to the argument. If the
principle which justifies retention of laws prohibiting abortions is valid,
the fact that disobedience of the law results in tragic consequences does not
invalidate the principle upon which the law rests. Moreover, it is doubtful
whether many of these deaths resulted from operations that could be legally
performed under the new abortion laws.
The expense that the state might incur by being forced to support chil.
dren, an expense which might have been avoided by aborting the children
in the first place, is utterly without merit as a consideration in the instant
82 But see Hatchard v. State, 79 Wisc. 357, 48 N.W. 380 (1891), holding that a threat of
suicide would not make an abortion a therapeutic one. See also WumhuMs, op. cit. supra
note 64, at 169-70.
83 See note 26 supra.
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context. The government, as has been indicated, is prohibited from taking
life without due process.84 The state should not be allowed to avoid the due
process requirement by postponing the vesting of the right which gives rise
to the requirement.
In essence, then, no adequate ground appears for the postponement of
the vesting of the right to live. The zygote will in all probability develop
in the natural course of things to whichever point has been otherwise arbitrarily selected for the vesting of the right. It would seem that the postponed vesting is merely a device to further unjustified social expediency.
But the fact remains that to deny the fetus the right to exist is as real a
deprivation at an earlier stage in its development as at a later stage. On
the other hand, our law does not lightly permit the taking of life in other
circumstances.8 5 It would seem that in the instant context the only sufficient
counter-weight to the fetal interest would be the probable loss of the
mother's life. The vesting at conception of the right to live would necessarily, then, make any attempts to deprive the fetus of life (except in the
situation indicated) unconstitutional.
It might be argued that if the right is extended back to the time of conception, it could as easily be extended to the pre-conception stage. However,
a logical as well as a biological distinction can be made between the conception and pre-conception stages. Human life in any cognizable form cannot exist prior to conception. Until that time the male and female elements
are distinct; until the joining of the separate cells, no unique human form
is in esse. Moreover, biologically the chromatic structure which distinguishes the zygote is self-contained. Sustenance is all that is necessary for
the evolution of the original cell into final human form. The sperm and
ovum, however, are and remain single-cell organisms, which can evolve
only through the formation of the zygote8s Furthermore, it is arguable that
the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,67 which held that
a state statute prohibiting birth control was an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy,8 8 impliedly rejected any recognition of protectible human life
in the sex cells. Had the contrary been true, the state would surely have
had a justifiable interest in protection of that life.
Enforcing the Right to Live
To fully protect the right to live vis-k-vis the state therapeutic abortion
statutes would probably take a special Congressional enactment defining
interference with that right as a crime. In the absence of such a statute, two
84
85
86
87
88

See notes 48-49 supra.
See notes 53-54 supra.
See 3 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 70, at 595-96.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Ibid.
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possible routes of enforcement might be taken. The first is civil in nature.
A suit for an injunction against the doctor and the child's parents could
be brought in federal court either directly upon the basis of the constitutional right or under the Civil Rights Act.89 The argument in the latter
case would be that the child would be deprived of his constitutional right
to live by persons acting under color of the state law which permitted
therapeutic abortion if the injunction were not granted. The administrator
of the child's estate should be able to maintain an action for damages on
the same grounds for wrongful death if the abortion had already taken
place, in states permitting the survival of such actions. Since the parents
normally would be in favor of the abortion, the only logical person to en.
force the right would be someone deriving his standing from the child.
Theoretically, even a complete stranger should be able to act for the child,
with the court's permission. A petition to the court for appointment as
guardian ad litem would be a feasible procedure.
The second means of protection is more theoretical. It is conceivable
that a United States Attorney could indict the doctor and parents for violation of section 242 of the Civil Rights Act. 90 The argument would be that
the persons involved were acting under color of the state law to wilfully
deprive another of his constitutional right to live; that the state statute
permitting therapeutic abortion stood in the face o1 the Civil Rights Act,
which had preempted the field; and, by virtue of the supremacy clause,
the federal legislation must necessarily prevail. It is unlikely, however, that
a court would countenance conviction on such an. argument, unless by
prospective application of the theory. The doctor and parents were probably acting in good faith under what they believed to be a just statute. It
would be inequitable to hold them criminally responsible under such
circumstances.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion attempts to present a cogent legal argument
against the exceptions from criminal prosecution provided in the therapeutic abortion statutes. As a legal argument, of course, it would yield to
changes in the law: an amendment to the federal constitution would render
it moot. However, since an amendment authorizing therapeutic abortion
would seemingly be predicated upon policy of rights-denial, a position
inconsistent, in this writer's view, with the spirit of the Constitution and
its guarantees to the individual, such a change in the Constitution is not
likely in the near future. This fact itself should, hopefully, cause courts to
pause and, if in doubt, to err on the side of the child.
J.T.S.
89 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).

90 Ibid.
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